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Policy Points:
 This analysis finds that government obesity policies in England
have largely been proposed in a way that does not readily lead to
implementation; that governments rarely commission evaluations
of previous government strategies or learn from policy failures; that
governments have tended to adopt less interventionist policy ap-
proaches; and that policies largely make high demands on indi-
vidual agency, meaning they rely on individuals to make behavior
changes rather than shaping external influences and are thus less
likely to be effective or equitable.
 These findingsmay help explain why after 30 years of proposed gov-
ernment obesity policies, obesity prevalence and health inequities
still have not been successfully reduced.
 If policymakers address the issues identified in this analysis, popu-
lation obesity could be tackled more successfully, which has added
urgency given the COVID-19 pandemic.
Context: In England, the majority of adults, and more than a quarter of chil-
dren aged 2 to 15 years live with obesity or excess weight. From 1992 to 2020,
even though the government published 14 obesity strategies in England, the
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prevalence of obesity has not been reduced. We aimed to determine whether
such government strategies and policies have been fit for purpose regarding
their strategic focus, nature, basis in theory and evidence, and implementation
viability.
Method: We undertook a mixed-methods study, involving a document re-
view and analysis of government strategies either wholly or partially dedi-
cated to tackling obesity in England. We developed a theory-based analyti-
cal framework, using content analysis and applied thematic analysis (ATA) to
code all policies. Our interpretation drew on quantitative findings and thematic
analysis.
Findings:We identified and analyzed 14 government strategies published from
1992 to 2020 containing 689 wide-ranging policies. Policies were largely pro-
posed in a way that would be unlikely to lead to implementation; the majority
were not interventionist andmade high demands on individual agency,meaning
that they relied on individuals to make behavior changes rather than shaping
external influences, and are thus less likely to be effective or to reduce health
inequalities.
Conclusions: The government obesity strategies’ failure to reduce the preva-
lence of obesity in England for almost 30 years may be due to weaknesses in the
policies’ design, leading to a lack of effectiveness, but they may also be due to
failures of implementation and evaluation. These failures appear to have led to
insufficient or no policy learning and governments proposing similar or iden-
tical policies repeatedly over many years. Governments should learn from their
earlier policy failures. They should prioritize policies that make minimal de-
mands on individuals and have the potential for population-wide reach so as to
maximize their potential for equitable impacts. Policies should be proposed in
ways that readily lead to implementation and evaluation.
Keywords: government, obesity, policy, policymaking, public health.
In England, the majority of men and women (67% and 60%,respectively) andmore than a quarter of children aged 2 to 15 (28%)live with obesity or excess body weight.1 Living with obesity or
excess weight is associated with long-term physical, psychological, and
social problems.2,3 Related health problems, such as type-2 diabetes, car-
diovascular disease, and cancers, are estimated to cost England’s National
Health Service (NHS) at least £6.1 billion per year, and the overall cost
of obesity to England’s wider society is estimated to be £27 billion per
year.4 The current COVID-19 pandemic has brought to light additional
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risks for people living with obesity, such as an increased risk of testing
positive for COVID-19 and of hospitalization, as well as advanced levels
of treatments and death.5
Obesity Policy in the UK
Obesity was first recognized by the UK government as a popula-
tion health challenge in 1991.6 Since then, 14 government strategies
(Figure 1), either wholly or partially dedicated to tackling obesity in
England, have been published by four different governments. However,
the prevalence of, and inequalities in obesity have not been successfully
reduced, and the government faces ongoing criticism for failing to in-
troduce effective policies.7–9
In 1998, the Labour government (1997-2010) devolved power to the
national assemblies in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, which
included responsibility for formulating and implementing all health
policies.10 Despite concordats aligning policies related to the National
Health Service (NHS), population health, and other, wider health issues
between the four national administrations, they are not legally binding,
and each continues to measure and address health issues, including obe-
sity, independently.10
The UK government defines government policy as “a course or
general plan of action to be adopted by government, party, person
etc.” and “statements of the government’s position, intent or action.”11
Obesity policy is a particular type of health policy that “aims to impact
positively on population health.”12 There are two main strands in health
policy—health care and public health. The former is concerned with
health care systems and the treatment of individuals, and the latter is
concerned with the promotion of population health, the prolongation
of life, and the prevention of ill health “through the organized efforts
of society.”13 Public health policy recognizes that health outcomes
are determined by more than an individual’s behavior (e.g., by social
and economic factors) and supports the integration of health across all
sectors and policy areas.12,14–17 In England, this means that whereas
the Department of Health and Social Care is primarily responsible for
coordinating national obesity policy in England, particular policies can
fall under the jurisdiction of other departments, such as the Department
for Education or the Department for Transport.
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Obesity Policy Research
There is a growing body of research on obesity policy and related pub-
lic health strategies.6,10,18–27 Studies have examined whether policies are
proposed in a way that “readily leads to implementation;”6,20 the typol-
ogy and framing of policies;22–26 issues related to regulation;24,28–30 and
the use of evaluation and evidence.18,19,21 To our knowledge, though,
no comprehensive or systematic analysis of obesity policies proposed by
government for England has been published. Instead, this research has
been confined to a smaller selection of government-proposed policies, to
nongovernmental policy proposals, and/or to a particular analytical con-
cept. The most directly relevant examination of obesity policy to date,
by Jebb and colleagues (2013), provides an overview of obesity policy in
England and the available evaluations. But it now is dated, does not in-
clude all proposed government policies and statements, and was a largely
descriptive analysis.6
Given that the rates of obesity and overweight remain high in Eng-
land with little sign of declining, a comprehensive analysis of govern-
ment policies to date may provide valuable insights into the strategic
approaches taken and their successes and failures, as well as to identify
the potential for more effective obesity policies. We aimed to fill this
gap in knowledge by answering two questions: What is the nature of
the strategies and policies to tackle obesity in England that the gov-
ernments have proposed to date? Were the strategies and policies fit for
purpose in terms of their strategic focus, the policy measures included,
their basis in theory and evidence, and their plans for implementation?
Methods
We adopted a mixed-methods approach using content analysis and ap-
plied thematic analysis (ATA) to investigate the governments’ strategy
documents31,32 before applying both qualitative and quantitative meth-
ods to the resultant data set, as explained next.
Data Set and Acquisition
We undertook an analysis of government strategies either wholly or par-
tially dedicated to tackling obesity in England. The term strategy refers
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to published government documents detailing an overall plan of action
designed to achieve a long-term aim, and the term policy refers to the
individual principles, programs, and statements of intent or action con-
tained in the strategies.11 We defined the data set as the distinct obesity
policies nested in strategies wholly or partially dedicated to tackling
obesity in England. Our time frame was set from when the UK govern-
ment first formally recognized that it should introduce specific actions
related to obesity, as published by the UK government (not devolved
administrations) and containing policies that the government sought to
introduce and/or had recommended, as well as policies that other sectors
were expected to introduce and were readily accessible. For strategies
partially focused on obesity, we included only those policies explicitly
proposed as solutions to obesity and overweight. We included strategies
and policies regardless of political party or the government department
from which they originated or the sector at which they were targeted.
We identified government obesity strategies and individual policies
contained in the strategies by searching the GOV.UK website, includ-
ing relevant government department websites, and recorded them in a
spreadsheet.We nested policies in their parent strategy and recorded and
numbered them in the order in which they appeared. We recorded the
year the strategy was published, the political party in government, the
obesity reduction target (if any), and the individual policies (verbatim).
Analytical Framework
To give our analysis a clear and comprehensive structure, we developed
a theory-based analytical framework using an iterative approach that in-
volved multiple readings and codings of the data. Some themes were de-
termined a priori to answer the prespecified research questions, drawing
on published frameworks; others emerged during the analysis. Content
analysis involves assigning codes or analytic categories to the data set,
whereas ATA moves beyond description to interpretation by identify-
ing, extracting, and interpreting “patterns of meaning in the data.”31,32
Applied thematic analysis helps increase rigor and transparency in quali-
tative research—thereby decreasing the potential for impressionistic and
biased results—and can flexibly accommodate the use of single, multi-
ple, or no theoretical frameworks.31
We used frameworks to analyze strategies and policies that were iden-
tified in the existing literature or created new ones, which we included in
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the overarching analytical framework. For policies that did not fit into
a framework’s predetermined codes, we created new codes.22 After we
had created a comprehensive coding system for the multiple themes, we
refined it and checked it once more against the existing theoretical lit-
erature before drawing up a final coding map (for all themes, codes, and
descriptions, see the Online Appendix). The main themes making up
the framework are target behavior type, policy type, implementation viability,
regulation approach, and intervention agency demands. Both authors agreed
on the coding map.
For the target behavior type, we coded policies according to the broad
behavior they sought to target (e.g., diet, physical activity, nonspecific).
For policy type, we used the widely recognized Nuffield Foundation “In-
tervention Ladder” to characterize policies according to the extent to
which they enabled or restricted choice.6,33 We created new codes for
policies that could not be characterized by the extent to which they
enabled or restricted choice. These included institutional, evaluation, re-
search, guidance and standards, and professional development policies (defini-
tions in the Online Appendix). We separated fiscal and non-fiscal incen-
tives and disincentives into discrete codes to distinguish between taxation
measures and other forms of incentives or disincentives such as a recogni-
tion award.34 The do nothing or simply monitor the current situation category
became monitor, as we were unable to identify inaction in the strategies.
For the implementation viability theme, we identified the recurrent core
components of existing frameworks that were used to assess the ex-
tent to which policies were conducive to implementation, including the
World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) international framework.20,35,36
The core components of these frameworks applicable in this context were
the specificity of the target population, the responsible actor, the pres-
ence of a monitoring and/or evaluation plan, the policy time frame, a
statement of cost estimation and/or directly allocated budget for the pol-
icy, evidence cited to support the policy, and the identification of a theory
of change to underpin the policy.20,35
Different regulation approaches have been examined in obesity pol-
icy research, including self-regulation by the food and drink indus-
try, barriers to government regulation, and laws introduced to prevent
obesity.24,28–30,37,38 Regulation is not always law, however; it can also be
an “act or process of controlling by rule or restriction.”39
To explore regulation approach, we analyzed the policies using Braith-
waite’s “responsive regulation pyramid.”40–42 Braithwaite helped shift
8 D.R.Z. Theis and M. White
the debate about business regulation away from a dichotomous dispute
between deterrence-based regulation and the removal of as many rules as
possible, to one focusing on how regulators could achieve greater com-
pliance and enforcement by understanding the context andmotivation of
those whose conduct they sought to regulate.42 The pyramid represents a
four-level regulatory approach, starting with capacity building at the base,
in which regulatory actors learn about a problem and build their capaci-
ties to tackle it, then escalating to a restorative approach involving largely
self-regulation measures to “repair the harm that has been caused” by
the problem.42 If not enough is done through self-regulation, the strat-
egy escalates to become more interventionist, and deterrencemeasures are
introduced by the government or a regulatory body. Finally, in more
extreme cases of inaction or insufficient action, incapacitation measures
are introduced, for example, rescinding a license to operate. We assessed
the policies for their stage of regulatory approach and whether regulatory
escalation was proposed as part of the policy—for example, if govern-
ment states that it will start with a self-regulation approach and move
to deterrence if self-regulation is deemed ineffective.
Finally, to analyze the policies, we used the concept of intervention
agency demands, which proposes that public health interventions differ
according to the demands they make on an individual’s agency (i.e., per-
sonal resources such as knowledge, engagement, and ability or power to
act).43,44 Since those interventions that make fewer demands on individ-
ual agency are likely to be the most effective and equitable, we used this
analysis to find those policies most likely to reduce health inequity.43,44
Backholer and colleagues offer a framework to assess the degree of
agency required for an intervention to influence behavior change and the
socioeconomic implications.44 As far as we know, this has not been used
to systematically and rigorously examine government obesity policies at
scale and over time. But in the absence of any other framework, we coded
policies according to the framework’s categorization and accepting that
ongoing work may be required to refine and validate such a framework
in the future.45 In relation to policies analyzed, we assigned a code only
on the basis of the demands on the members of the population to whom
a policy was directed, accepting that some policy interventions may also
make demands on policymakers and professionals to ensure their im-
plementation. We excluded from the coding those policy types with no
clear or direct demands on individual agency (e.g., the appointment of
a new minister).
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We coded policy interventions that simply inform individuals about
an issue and leave them to determine their preventive actions as being
agentic and further coded them according to environmental level, that
is, micro (schools, worksites, clinic, home) and macro (national, state,
community). This category was represented by policies (e.g., informa-
tion leaflets, social marketing campaigns) that require a high level of
individual agency because people must notice (e.g., an informational
leaflet), understand the information (usually requiring literacy, numer-
acy, or both), be motivated to change their behavior in response (e.g.,
choose healthier products), and then have the means and ability to do
so.
At the other end of the spectrum are structural policies that eliminate
or restrict choice and that therefore demand the least individual agency.
Such policies include banning unhealthy food being advertised or sold
somewhere, meaning that people are less exposed to unhealthy options
and so are less likely to need to acquire and use resources to choose be-
tween these options. We also coded these according to environmental
level. Finally, between the two ends of the spectrum are agento-structural
interventions, which account for the environment in which people be-
have and make choices but in which individual agency still plays an
important role. An example is the provision of healthy food in a can-
teen or urban design to facilitate walking and cycling. We further coded
these according to environmental level. Figure 2 presents Backholer and
colleagues’ framework for the “likely impact of obesity prevention strate-
gies on socioeconomic inequalities in population weight,” and the On-
line Appendix sets out the details of the six agency codes.44
Data Analysis
In line with ATA, we first developed our analytical framework, as just
described. Next, we analyzed all strategy documents to identify the spe-
cific policies they contained. Our analysis required multiple readings
of the strategies to ensure that all individual policies had been identi-
fied according to the definition. We then undertook the initial thematic
analysis and coding of the policies. Each policy was coded according to
the categories of the five themes in our framework (see the Online Ap-
pendix) in an Excel spreadsheet. A single coder conducted the coding
and thematic analysis. To check for interrater reliability, a second coder
coded 10% of the policies, and both coders resolved any disagreements
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by discussion. Once the coding was complete, the number and propor-
tion of codes were calculated for the policies overall, for each strategy,
and for each government from 1992 to 2020. We then examined the re-
sults to identify patterns and meanings in the data, for example, changes
over time and under different governments.We extracted examples from
policy documents to illustrate our analysis.
Results
We found 14 government strategies that fulfilled the inclusion criteria.
Table 1 lists the strategies by month and year, political party in govern-
ment, obesity reduction target(s) (if any), proportion of policies by target
behavior type (diet, physical activity, or nonspecific), and the total number
of policies. One strategy was published by the Conservative government
(1979-1997), seven by the Labour government (1997-2010), two by the
Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government (2010-2015),
and four by the Conservative government (2015-2020).
Seven of the strategies were broad public health strategies containing
obesity as well as non obesity policies such as those for tobacco smok-
ing and food safety. The other seven strategies contained only obesity
policies, for example, diet and/or physical activity policies. Twelve of
the 14 strategies contained obesity reduction targets, but only five of
these were specific, numerical targets rather than statements like “aim
to reduce obesity.” Strategies ranged from those containing 118 policies
(Choosing Activity, 2005) to just nine (Food Matters, 2008). The median
number of policies per strategy was 35.
Half of the strategies were set in the context of tackling health in-
equalities (Saving Lives, 1999; Choosing Health, 2004; Choosing a Better
Diet, 2005; Choosing Activity, 2005; Health Lives, Healthy People, 2010;
andA call to action on obesity, 2011). Although two (HealthyWeight, Health
Lives, 2008, and Food Matters, 2008) discussed health inequality, the
strategies’ purpose was not to tackle it. Three of the strategies (Child-
hood Obesity: a plan for action, Chapter 2, 2018 (COP2); Childhood Obesity:
a plan for action, Chapter 3, 2019 (COP3); and Tackling Obesity, 2020)
were meant to combat health inequality and included health inequality
reduction targets. One strategy (Reducing Health Inequalities, 1999) con-
centrated on reducing health inequalities, and one (Health of the Nation,
1992) did not discuss health inequality or inequity at all.
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Of those policies addressing health-related behavior (diet or physical
activity), a third were diet-specific; a quarter were physical activity–
specific; and the rest (42%) were nonspecific or included efforts to
address both diet and activity, for example, the Healthy Schools
Programme, which contains measures to improve both physical activ-
ity levels and diet in schools.
These strategies also contained a wide variety of policy types, from in-
troducing food standards in schools and providing parents with support
to live healthier lives to placing restrictions on television advertising of
unhealthy products to children and reformulating unhealthy products
(see Table 2). Many of the policies proposed were similar or exactly the
same in multiple strategies over multiple years, often with no reference
to having been proposed in a previous strategy. Only one strategy (Saving
Lives, 1999) was based on a formal, independent evaluation of the pre-
vious government’s strategy (Health of the Nation, 1992).46 Other strate-
gies made more explicit references to previous strategies when there was
a direct link between them. For example, A call to action on obesity (2011)
referencesHealthy Lives, Healthy People (2010) because it proposes “build-
ing on the foundation laid down in the White Paper.”
Overall, the largest proportion of policies were enable policies (20%)
such as the Healthy Start Programme, which provides vouchers for low-
income families to exchange for fresh fruit and vegetables and other
products.47 There was also a relatively high proportion of guidance or
standards policies (16%), aimed largely at the public sector, schools, and
the NHS; institutional policies (12%), for example, the introduction of
a ministerial position; professional development policies (11%), like train-
ing for health care professionals; and inform policies (12%), such as 5 A
DAY.
In comparison, we found very few fiscal or non-fiscal disincentive poli-
cies (0.3% and 0.4%, respectively);monitor policies such as weighing and
measuring people regularly (2%); restrict choice policies like banning the
promotion of unhealthy foods (3%); change default policies such as refor-
mulation (3%); and non-fiscal incentive policies like workplace awards for
creating healthy environments (3%). No strategies proposed fiscal incen-
tives (e.g., tax breaks on healthy products) or eliminate choice policies (e.g.,
banning an unhealthy product). Table 2 breaks down these policy types by
government strategy and year.
The idea of implementation viability could be found in the majority of
policies, with 71% suggesting a responsible agent, 57% setting a target




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Analysis of Government Obesity Strategies in England 19
population, 56% stating a theory of change, and 50% a time frame. But
only 24% of the policies had any details of a monitoring or evaluation
plan; only 19% cited any evidence to support the policy proposals; and
only 9% offered any details about cost or included an allocated budget.
We also looked at the proportion of all policies that fulfilled our seven
implementation criteria and found that 197 policies—the largest pro-
portion (29%)—did not fulfill a single one. This compares to only 59
policies (8%) that fulfilled all seven implementation viability criteria.
For the rest of the policies, 75 (11%) fulfilled six criteria, 33 (5%) ful-
filled five, 177 (25%) fulfilled four, 39 (6%) fulfilled three, 13 (2%)
fulfilled two, and 96 policies (14%) fulfilled one.
Table 3 shows the distribution of implementation viability components
by strategy. The Conservative government’s strategies published be-
tween 2016 and 2019 contain the highest proportion of policies spec-
ifying a target population (87%, 94%, and 92%), and of these, COP2
(2018) contains the highest proportion of policies with cited evidence
(64%) and/or a theory of change (91%). Those strategies published by
the Labour government between 2004 and 2005 contain the highest
proportion of policies specifying a responsible agent (99%, 100%, and
99%) and a time frame (47%, 92%, and 93%). All these strategies con-
tained a relatively low proportion of policies that specify a monitoring
or evaluation plan (40% or less) and the estimated cost or a directly al-
located budget (32% or less).
In our analysis of regulation approach (Table 4), a relatively high pro-
portion of policies were capacity-building policies with no indication of
escalation (45%) or were restorative policies with no indication of escala-
tion (39%). A much lower proportion of capacity-building and restora-
tive policies indicated regulatory escalation (8% and 3%, respectively).
The proportion of deterrence policies with and without an indication
of escalation was very low (1% and 4%, respectively), and we found no
incapacitation policies. These findings show that the majority of gov-
ernment regulatory approaches in England (95%) have been capacity
building and restorative, focusing on more voluntary measures that do
not seek to deter actions.
Until 2004, the governments’ regulatory policies had no indication
of regulatory escalation, meaning that the policies were largely proposed
without detailing what might happen in the case of insufficient action or
change. Since 2004, more deterrence measures have been proposed, such



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24 D.R.Z. Theis and M. White
as legislation on nutrition labeling for prepackaged foods, the Office of
Communication Regulator’s restriction of television advertising of un-
healthy products, and a levy on sugary soft drinks. When the deterrence
policies did indicate regulatory escalation, they were not suggesting in-
troducing incapacitation measures but were indicating an extension of
deterrence measures, like expanding the Soft Drinks Industry Levy to
more products. COP2 (2018) and the most recent Tackling Obesity (2020)
had the highest proportion of deterrence policies (27% and 24%, respec-
tively), and four strategies contained no deterrence policies (Saving Lives,
1999; Reducing Health Inequalities, 1999; Food Matters, 2008; andHealthy
Lives, Healthy People, 2010).
We identified 312 policies that had the potential to affect individual
agency but excluded the remaining 377 because they did not appear able
to directly affect individual agency, such as the introduction of a min-
isterial position. Of the 312, we coded the largest proportion of poli-
cies (43%) as being agentic, meaning they would require individuals to
draw on substantial personal resources to engage with an intervention
effectively and would thus be less likely to be effective or equitable. Of
these, 28% took place in a micro environmental level (e.g., school, work-
site, clinic, home) and 72% at a macro level (e.g., national, local, com-
munity). The second largest proportion were agento-structural (37%),
and 19% were structural, meaning that they made the fewest demands
on individual agency and thus were the most likely to be effective and
equitable. A substantial majority (64%) of the structural interventions
were voluntary, for example, the voluntary industry reformulation of un-
healthy products, which research has shown tend to not meet intended
objectives.48,49 The voluntary nature of such interventions also high-
lights that agency with regard to interventions rests not only on the
final target, as assessed by this scale (i.e., the population) but also on key
stakeholders (e.g., commercial manufacturers and producers).
Table 5 shows the number (%) of policies in each strategy by the de-
mands they make on individual agency, according to Backholer and col-
leagues’ framework for the “likely impact of obesity prevention strate-
gies on socioeconomic inequalities in population weight.”44 The pro-
portion of agentic and agento-structural policies has remained relatively
stable over the three decades. The proportion of structural policies was
highest in the more recent COP1 (2016), COP2 (2018), and Tackling
Obesity (2020) strategies (58%, 56%, and 40%, respectively), includ-
ing banning the price and location promotions of unhealthy products
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Analysis of Government Obesity Strategies in England 27
and the introduction of a 9 pm watershed on unhealthy TV and online
advertising.
Discussion
Summary of the Main Findings
In this mixed-method study, we identified all the government-proposed
obesity policies in England (n = 689) within obesity strategies (n =
14) over almost three decades (1992-2020). We determined their nature
and whether they had been adequate for their strategic focus, the policy
measures included, their basis in theory and evidence, and their imple-
mentation plans. Using established theoretical frameworks and applied
thematic analysis, we identified five main themes to define the nature of
policies (target behavior type, policy type, implementation viability, regulation
approach, and intervention agency demands).
A wide range of policy types were proposed, with a greater emphasis
on diet than on physical activity. A substantial proportion of policies
in all the strategies involved guidance or standards, professional devel-
opment, institutional, informational, and enabling policies, indicating
that governments have tended to prioritize the provision of informa-
tion and capacity building in their obesity strategies rather than directly
shaping the choices available to individuals through population-level
fiscal and regulatory measures, except for the more recent exceptions
(e.g., the Soft Drinks Industry Levy).
Many of the proposed policies were similar or exactly the same in
multiple strategies over multiple years, often with no reference to their
presence in a previous strategy. Only one strategy (Saving Lives, 1999)
commissioned a formal independent evaluation of the previous govern-
ment’s strategy (Health of the Nation, 1992).46 Few substantial changes in
the proportions of the different policy types proposed appeared over time.
The only non fiscal disincentives were proposed by the Labour govern-
ment (1997-2010). The more recent COP2 (2018) and Tackling Obesity
(2020) contain the highest proportions of restrictive policies (e.g., ban-
ning price promotions of unhealthy products), and COP1 (2016) and
COP3 (2019) contain the only fiscal disincentive policies (e.g., the Soft
Drinks Industry Levy).
Overall, these policies were not proposed in a way that could readily
lead to effective implementation. The largest proportion of all policies
28 D.R.Z. Theis and M. White
(29%) did not fulfill one of the seven implementation viability crite-
ria, compared to just 8% of policies that fulfilled all seven. Only 24%
included a monitoring or evaluation plan; 19% cited any supporting sci-
entific evidence; and only 9% included details about likely costs or an
allocated budget. The majority of the policies contained a clear respon-
sible agent (71%), a target population (57%), a theory of change (56%),
and a time frame (50%).
In regard to regulation approach, a high proportion were capacity-
building policies (53%) and restorative policies (42%). The proportion
of deterrence policies was very low (5%), and there were no incapaci-
tation policies. Of the 312 policies that had the potential to make de-
mands on individual agency, we assessed the largest proportion as being
agentic (43%); that is, they require individuals to draw on substantial
personal resources to engage effectively with an intervention and thus
are unlikely to be effective and equitable. For the other eligible policies,
37%were agento-structural and 19%were structural, meaning that they
made the fewest demands on individual agency and were most likely to
be effective and equitable. Given that 13 of the 14 strategies explicitly
recognized the need to reduce health inequality, including one strategy
that was primarily focused on reducing inequality in health and three
that contained inequality reduction targets, the fact that only 19% of
the policies proposed were likely to be effective in reducing inequalities
is of great concern and accordingly may explain why efforts to reduce
healthy inequalities have also widely failed.50–52 Furthermore, a sub-
stantial majority (64%) of the structural interventions were voluntary,
for example, the voluntary industry reformulation of unhealthy prod-
ucts, which research has shown tend to not meet set objectives and so
are even less likely to be effective or equitable.48,49
Strengths and Limitations
Strengths. Our analysis is the most comprehensive to date of govern-
ment policies on obesity internationally, as it critically assesses all poli-
cies proposed by successive governments (n= 689) and explores how the
nature of policies changed over an extensive period (28 years). We rigor-
ously applied a theory-based analytical framework and used ATA, which
helps reduce the likelihood of bias by prioritizing a clear and system-
atic approach to the research while always maintaining a high level of
transparency and reflexivity. Our method is also readily replicable, thus
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offering an opportunity for comparability with future research in the
UK or elsewhere. The mixed-methods approach enabled us to identify
and present quantifiable patterns and for these patterns to be understood
and interpreted through examples.
Our study updates previous analyses of obesity strategies in
England6,21 and offers a deeper and richer analysis, as it uses several
different theoretical concepts, including the Nuffield Intervention Lad-
der, implementation frameworks, and Braithwaite’s responsive regula-
tion pyramid.20,22,35,53 Our analysis can be compared to Haynes and col-
leagues’ study (2017), which examined stakeholder policy recommen-
dations by their “impact on individual autonomy,” that is, how much
individual liberty they were perceived to take away.23 Conversely, our
study analyzed policies according to Backholer and colleagues’ frame-
work assessing the degree of agency required for an obesity intervention
to influence behavior change, which arguably presents a more positive
way of perceiving the impact that policies have on individuals.44 For
example, a policy deemed to remove individual liberty in Haynes and
colleagues’ categorization is viewed as a policy that is empowering by
removing the need for individuals to use their own resources in order to
gain a healthy benefit. In regard to regulatory approach, we offered new
empirical evidence of the regulatory approaches that UK governments
have taken over almost three decades, a subject that has been the focus
of much research.24,29,37,54,55
We presented a transparent coding scheme, which we encourage re-
searchers to test and use to analyze other government strategies both in
the UK and internationally. Only through the continual refinement and
testing of coding frameworks like the one presented here can we reach a
deeper, more comprehensive, and potentially generalizable understand-
ing of government policy.
The use of various analytical themes demonstrates not only how these
policies affect people at the individual level but also how they affect
the responsible sectors. By analyzing the policies accordingly, we have
demonstrated the need for those conceiving, designing, implementing,
and evaluating policies to consider carefully both the intended and the
unintended consequences and the implications of government policies
on individuals and the responsible sector(s). For example, a policy de-
signed to facilitate individual choice may require government to limit
the choices of a responsible sector (e.g., mandatory menu labeling fa-
cilitates individuals’ choice by providing nutritional information, but
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at the same time it takes away the out-of-home food sector’s choice of
whether to implement it. This is justified on the grounds that it will
have a net benefit for population health without major negative impacts
on the commercial sector.56 Nonetheless, policymakers should seek to
reconcile these implications during the design stage so as to minimize
any potential negative unintended consequences.
As far as we are aware, ours is the first systematic and comprehensive
analysis of government obesity policies according to an assessment of
intervention demands on individual agency, hypothesized to be impor-
tant for policy effectiveness and equity.43 Our categorization of policies
according to agency was pragmatic, intuitive, and based on theory, but
more work will be needed to refine and validate this framework.45 Al-
though further refinement is strongly encouraged, we would argue that
the assessment undertaken here has face validity and demonstrates the
extent to which UK policies for obesity tend to be highly “agentic,” fur-
ther signaling concern about their potential for both effectiveness and
equitable impacts, even though 13 of the 14 strategies explicitly recog-
nize the need to reduce health inequalities.43,44
This study presents novel insights into the policies proposed within
government obesity strategies in England, how they were proposed, and
the implications for their implementation. For example, ours is the first
study to find that the largest proportion of government obesity policies
do not fulfill a single implementation viability criterion, with govern-
ment strategies rarely suggesting obesity policies that formally cite sci-
entific evidence or include a cost and/or budget or a monitoring or eval-
uation plan. It is the first to point out that only one UK government
strategy formally evaluated a previous strategy, thereby revealing the
lack of obvious learning from and evaluation of previous government ac-
tions. These findings have important implications for policymakers and
may help explain why obesity levels have not been successfully reduced
in England, despite the hundreds of government policies published over
three decades.
Limitations. Our study analyzed policies only in government obesity
strategies, which are only one type of policy document and one part of
the policy process. We also favored breadth over depth, assessing 689
policies using a range of analytical lenses. We did not, however, conduct
a deeper analysis of specific aspects of the policies, such as the quality of
scientific evidence cited in policy documents and whether or how well
policies were implemented. Given that 14 government strategies have
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been introduced during the last 28 years and yet have not reduced obe-
sity rates, a deeper analysis would shed more light on the success or fail-
ure of these attempts at policymaking to address this major public health
challenge. We did not conduct systematic searches for additional docu-
mentary material related to the policies we identified. This information
might have been published in other government policy documents that
could shed further light on the policies we studied. For example, we
found that potentially important information was often missing from
policy documents, such as the details of an evaluation plan. This may be
because there was no evaluation plan or because it was published sep-
arately (e.g., by a government research agency). This is another avenue
for research.
Instead of a mixed-methods approach, we might have adopted a
different—for example, more qualitative—approach to investigate the
data more closely and leading to more detailed interpretations. But we
felt that ours was the right approach as a first stage to get a sense of the
breadth of the policies and their overall nature.
The coding was not always straightforward, as the policies could often
be interpreted in several different ways. This links to the question of who
is responsible and required to act in order to succeed in changing behav-
ior. For example, mandatory menu labeling requires industry to change
its behavior, as well as individuals to choose different options as a result
of having nutritional information. This means that menu labeling could
be deemed a restrict policy because it restricts industry from choosing
whether to havemenu labeling; it could be deemed an incentive policy as
it encourages industry to reformulate and/or to offer more healthful food
and drink; or it could be deemed an information policy if it focuses on
how it gives individuals information.57 Our study concentrated on the
demands that policies make on individuals in relation to agency. But
it could have accounted for the demands that policies make on many
actors when applicable. This also raises the question of whether a more
sophisticated categorization of obesity policies is necessary (e.g., one that
takes into account the agency demands on the responsible sector and on
individuals, since many policies that benefit the health of individuals
are perceived to have negative consequences on industry in regard to
cost and freedom).29,30,43 Although Michie and colleagues’ “behaviour
change wheel” recognizes the distinction between the responsible ac-
tor and the individual, their model does not explain what each policy
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requires from both the responsible actor and individual in order for the
policy to be effective.58
Some policy programs were continued more explicitly over longer
periods of time and across different governments (e.g., National Child
Measurement Programme), whereas others appeared to be similar poli-
cies but actually had been rebranded in new strategies by successive
governments (e.g., reformulation policies). It was beyond the scope of
our study to analyze this aspect, but increasing the understanding of the
extent to which different political parties eschew or embrace the same
public health policy ideas, and why, could add much to our current
knowledge.
Interpretation and Implications for
Policy and Practice
This study offers evidence that to date the UK governments have largely
favored a less interventionist approach to reducing obesity, regardless of
political party. The regulation approaches of the vast majority of poli-
cies (95%) were capacity building or restorative; that is, they focused on
building the responsible actors’ capacity to deliver, or they trusted the
responsible actors to reduce population obesity levels, regardless of any
possible conflicts, such as the food industry’s profiting from more food
purchases. Governments may have avoided a more deterrence-based, in-
terventionist approach for fear of being perceived as controlling (the so-
called nanny-state) or because they lacked knowledge about which more
interventionist measures were likely to be effective.59
Braithwaite emphasized that more government intervention (i.e., de-
terrence) does not necessarily achieve greater compliance and that high
compliance can be achieved without the use of deterrence measures like
taxation.53 This could mean that less interventionist approaches that
were deemed to have failed did not fail because they were less inter-
ventionist but because they did not fulfill the necessary conditions to
achieve high compliance. Such policies would require a “networked”
relationship between regulator and regulated, third-party involvement
(e.g., a public interest group) to prevent “regulatory capture,” such as
when an industry or sector uses regulation to benefit private interests,
thereby ensuring that those regulated have the capacity to deliver the
policy, that consequences are meaningful and loopholes minimized, and
that the process is transparent.29,41,53,60
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Earlier research showed the influence of neoliberal ideology, which ad-
vocates broad notions of personal responsibility, individual choice, free
markets, and antigovernment intervention as barriers to public health
policy.61,62 Cullerton and colleagues found that recommending inter-
ventionist policies like legislation to tackle public health issues “creates
tension within nations with a liberal tradition” because it is seen as tak-
ing away individual choice and impinging on individual and market
freedoms.62 To navigate this tension, the UK government has looked to
behavioral economics and “nudge” theory for solutions to change peo-
ple’s behavior without compulsion and consequently founded the Be-
havioural Insights Team in 2010 to inform policy.63
For example,Healthy Lives, Healthy People (2010) states that “the Gov-
ernment’s approach to improving health and wellbeing … is therefore
based on the following actions, which reflect the Coalition’s core val-
ues of freedom, fairness and responsibility,” and includes policies such as
the Public Health Responsibility Deal, which allowed the food and drinks
industry to choose whether they delivered certain policies like labeling
menus.33 Evaluations of the Public Health Responsibility Deal have shown
why it failed to meet its objectives, largely because it did not fulfill con-
ditions for effective self-regulation policies, including being informed
by evidence and being targeted, measurable, attributable, feasible, and
with a time frame, as well as being independently and rigorously evalu-
ated and transparently reported.48,64
The vilification of government responsibility is commonly repre-
sented by the “nanny state” metaphor, which associates government in-
tervention with “a fussing, over-bearing nanny who intrudes into the
private lives of citizens and treats them as infants who cannot be trusted
to make their own decisions.”61 Swinburn and colleagues argued that
although “genuine progress lies beyond the impasse of these entrenched
dichotomies,” the strength of industry opposition and government re-
luctance to regulate presents a major barrier.65 Even though our study
offers evidence that the UK government still favors a less intervention-
ist approach in England, we also observed that this seems to be chang-
ing. This may be because government is recognizing that the existing
approaches have not been effective and/or that more interventionist ap-
proaches are increasingly acceptable to the public.66 COP2 (2018) and
the most recent Tackling Obesity (2020) contain the highest proportions
of deterrence measures, which may indicate a greater acceptance by the
government, regardless of party ideology, of deterrence measures. But
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the stronger government interventions proposed in COP2 (2018), such
as legislation to mandate menu labeling, were not implemented before
they were then proposed again in Tackling Obesity (2020) only two years
later. This demonstrates that policy proposals do not automatically lead
to implementation, even within a two-year period. More worrying is the
observation that the same policies can be proposed with no reference to
having been previously proposed but not implemented.
Our study has shown that policies are largely proposed in a way that
would not readily lead to implementation and that only five strategies
set a specific numerical obesity reduction target. This may help explain
why such policies have not yet reduced obesity prevalence and health
inequities.20,26,35 No matter how well-intended and evidence-informed
a policy is, if it is nebulously written without a clear target, it makes
implementation difficult, and it is unlikely the policy will be deemed
successful.35 The lack of such basic information as the cost of certain
policies was further highlighted in a recent National Audit Office report
on the UK government’s approach to tackling childhood obesity in Eng-
land, which found that the Department of Health and Social Care did not
know how much the central government had spent tackling childhood
obesity.67 This raises a number of questions. For example, do govern-
ments deliberately propose policies in such a way, or is it a fault of the
policy process? If the former, then perhaps proposing policies serves a
more political purpose of being seen to be acting, that is, a rhetorical
rather than a meaningful commitment. But if it is the latter, then what
is the purpose of proposing policies at all if they are unlikely to lead to
implementation?
The lack of government clarity and the information about the po-
tential effectiveness, implementation, and cost of its own policies may
be further compounded by an apparent aversion to conducting high-
quality, independent evaluations (which risk demonstrating failure, as
well as success), which in turn may reduce a government’s ability to
learn lessons from past policies.21 Baggott found that England’s public
health policies either tightly controlled their evaluation in order to min-
imize criticism, were not conducted at all, or were conducted in a way
that made lessons for future policymaking ambiguous.21
The time it takes to put together a strategy may also explain why
policies are often proposed without information that would make them
more likely to be implemented. For example, it was announced in May
2020 that Prime Minister Boris Johnson would be publishing a new
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government obesity strategy, which was then published two and a half
months later.68,69 This could be considered insufficient time to prepare
a highly implementable government strategy. Nonetheless, the major-
ity of policies proposed in 2020 had already been proposed in earlier
strategies, such as COP2 (2018), but were never implemented. Thus the
government, as well as associated agencies like Public Health England,
should have had sufficient time to prepare fully developed implemen-
tation plans. And if they had already developed implementation plans,
then why were these not included in the strategy?
Unanswered Questions and Future Research
Our study points to questions that are critical to tackling rising levels
of obesity internationally, such as the question of what we should expect
from a government obesity strategy. Furthermore, if numerous strategies
have been introduced without reducing obesity, then what aspects of the
approaches used to date are not working, and what should be prioritized
instead?
From almost any point of view, it seems reasonable to expect that
government policy should have sufficient scope to address the problem
under consideration, that it should be based on the best available theory
and evidence, and that it should be proposed and implemented in such
a way that it can be effective. All these aspects of policymaking were
found wanting in obesity policy in England. Foresight’s report, Tack-
ling Obesities: Future Choices (2007), contended that obesity is a systemic
challenge and that to stand any chance of reversing current trends, ef-
fective interventions across a wide range of fronts would be necessary.
To date, such policies have been limited in their focus (regarding the
range of systemic drivers of obesity identified by Foresight) and have
had far too great a focus on downstream interventions, with individual
behavior change framed as a “choice” agenda and insufficient empha-
sis on upstream population interventions. Both theory and evidence to
support population interventions have grown over the 13 years since the
Foresight report (2007) and, in the UK at least, we are starting to see
the beginnings of a move toward population-level policies.17
Yet even the most recent policies have been criticized for address-
ing an insufficient number of fundamental drivers of obesity to be able
to make a significant impact on the population and for representing
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relatively weak levers for change. Obesity arises as an unintended con-
sequence of those food, transport, work, and leisure systems designed
primarily for other purposes (most notably economic growth).17 The re-
sult is obesogenic environments, which encourage people to overeat and
be physically inactive. Because these systems are complex and adaptive,
when we intervene in them, they change to achieve a new equilibrium,
a point at which prior goals can still be achieved. Thus if a fiscal policy
reduces profits (and sector growth) from unhealthy foods, the food in-
dustry will rapidly mitigate the impact of the tax by finding new ways
to increase profits and growth, which might negate or undermine the
effects of the public health policy.56 This has been described in other
fields as the “balloon effect.”70
Our analysis uncovered both good and poor policymaking from the
perspective of enabling implementation. Figure 3 shows how the Labour
government’s policies were proposed in its Choosing a Better Diet strat-
egy (2005). It explains clearly what the policy is, who is responsible,
and when the policy will be implemented.71 Such an approach could be
extended in future government strategies to include additional criteria
that would better ensure that policies are more readily implementable,
such as evaluation plans and costs. Further research could evaluate the
impact of such a framework.
We did not analyze the quality of the evidence cited in the strategies,
so future research could explore the quality and type of evidence cited
and whether the proposed policies align with the highest-quality evi-
dence available at the time. Linked to this is how policies are framed
based on evidence and understanding. We did not analyze the way poli-
cies were framed and on what arguments they were based. Future re-
search could examine the framing of proposed policies by different pol-
icymakers and explore whether this is linked to the types of policies
proposed and changes over time or under different governments.
It will be important to distinguish the failings of the policies them-
selves from implementation failures. The failure to reduce obesity rates
in England, despite so many strategies being published, could be be-
cause of the partial or complete failure of the policies’ implementation.
Future research could explore the extent to which policies were imple-
mented and in what ways they differed from those proposed but not
implemented.36 Another explanation could be the regulatory approach
taken. In this study, we have presented an important starting point in
analyzing the implications of different regulatory approaches. A more
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in-depth analysis of regulatory approaches taken by the government
might help spell out the relationship between policy types, regulatory
approach, compliance levels, and associated outcomes.
Future research should also explore who or what is behind the formu-
lation of government obesity policies and strategies, so as to generate a
greater understanding of the policy process itself. This may help explain
why certain policies are favored over others, what barriers and facili-
tators appear in the policymaking process, why some people are more
influential than others, and why policies are proposed with or without
supporting evidence.
Conclusions
Our study has provided new evidence that in almost 30 years, the UK
government has proposed 689 wide-ranging policies to tackle obesity in
England but has not yet successfully and consistently reduced obesity
prevalence or health inequities. Only one of the 14 government strate-
gies commissioned an independent evaluation of previous government
strategies for obesity, which suggests a significant deficit of government
policy learning and may explain why similar or identical policies are put
forward multiple times over many years.
Many of these policies were set out in a way that does not readily lead
to implementation, and the largest proportion of policies did not ful-
fill any of the implementation viability criteria. Overall, governments
have adopted less interventionist policy approaches, although this has
changed in recent years. The policies have relied on a design that makes
high demands on individual agency, meaning that they rely on individ-
uals to make behavior changes rather than shaping external influences
such as the environment or economy and are thus less likely to be effec-
tive or reduce health inequities. We found that a wide range of inade-
quacies related to government obesity policies are likely to explain why
governments have repeatedly failed to reduce the inequalities in, and the
prevalence of, obesity.
To increase the likelihood of policies being implemented, govern-
ments should accompany policy proposals with information ensuring
they can readily lead to implementation, such as a clearly identified
responsible agent, evaluation plan, and time frame; and to increase
the likelihood of effectiveness and equitability, governments should
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increasingly focus obesity strategies on “low agency” population inter-
vention policies that more comprehensively address the most powerful
levers for system change.
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